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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Court order to sell real estate for the payment of a widow's allowance and
not ejectment. 21 Also, the Nettleton Bank Case,22 cited with approval Force
v. Van Patton,23 which held that ejectment is an action which involves title
to real estate, and permits direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Not only
is the authority of the principal case faulty, but also the logic of the
proposition is with the dissenting opinion. Ejectment today is more than
a possessory action, it is a mode of trying title and the plaintiff must re-
cover on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of his ad-
versaries.2- In the present case title was put in issue by the defendant
pleading facts showing him to be the owner. Thus under the decisions of
the Tooker case and the Maxwell case appeal should lie to the Supreme
Court. As is pointed out in the most recent decision on the subject,25 by
Division no. 2, that until there is a decision en banc on the point, because
of the absurd conflict between Division no. 1 in the Ballenger case and
Division no. 2 in the Tooker case, appeals to the Supreme Court will turn
not upon the constitutional provision but rather upon the Division to which
the case is assigned.
R. L. S.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARMENT OF JUDGES-[Oklahoma].--On his
return to private practice, disbarment proceedings were commenced against
a former county judge for private acts of moral turpitude" committed
while he occupied his judicial office. Held; the Board of Governors of the
state bar (of Oklahoma) have the jurisdiction and authority to hear charges
against a practicing lawyer of disbarable offenses involving moral turpi-
tude rendering him unfit to be permitted to continue the practice of law,
even though the offenses evidencing such loss of character occurred while
he theretofore held judicial office.2
This case is in line with the weight of authority, although the Oklahoma
21. Supra, note 20.
22. Supra, note 20.
23. Force v. Van Patton, 149 Mo. 499, 50 S. W. 906 (1899) which holds
that ejectment is an action which involves title to real estate.
24. Ballenger v. Windes, 93 S. W. (2d) 882 (Mo. 1936). The dissent
points out that at the time of Blackstone ejectment was the only way to try
title. This was the rule in Missouri down to 1897 when a special statute
was enacted to try title. Mo. St. Ann. sec. 1520, p. 1682. In Missouri the
action of ejectment to do away with the fiction of lease, entry and ouster,
allows the plaintiff to plead only possession. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 1365-1370.
However, the plaintiff must prove he is legally entitled to possession and
must recover by the strength of his own title and not the weakness of his
adversaries when title is put in issue. Brown v. Simpson, 201 S. W. 898
(Mo., 1918).
25. Welsh v. Brown, 96 S. W. (2d) 345 (Mo., 1936) by Div. 2.
1. The case does not specify the particular acts of moral turpitude in-
volved.
2. Weston v. Board of Governors of State Bar, 61 P. (2d) 229 (Olda.,
1936).
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court seemingly treats it as a case of first instance.3 The majority of cases
hold that the office of judge does not protect an attorney from the conse-
quences of his acts of moral turpitude committed while occupying his judi-
cial office. 4 A respectable minority, however, holds that an attorney who is
a judge should not be attacked in his character as a lawyer where such an
attack might indirectly cause his removal from the bench by means other
than those provided by law.5 Under the majority view, although the re-
spondent at the institution of proceedings is no longer a judge, he can be
disbarred for private acts committed while he occupied his judicial office.0
The real issue which might be raised in regard to the disbarment of an
attorney who is a judge is that disbarment should not be used as a means
of removing judges. It is clear that in a court created by the legislature,
as distinguished from one created by the state constitution, this contention
has little weight, as removal of judges need not be by a constitutional
process such as impeachment. Besides, as the legislature has complete con-
trol over legislative courts,7 it can provide that attorneys, although they
are acting as judges, can be disbarred for moral turpitude in their character
as attorney. In the case of a judge of a constitutional court some difficul-
ties might arise. But in this connection it must be pointed out that the
majority of courts have repeatedly held that disbarment is not a civil or
3. The Oklahoma court states in the above decision that "no judicial
decision has been cited by either of the parties directly upon the point in
issue, and our independent investigation has failed to disclose one." Al-
though this statement may refer only to the jurisdiction of Oklahoma, it
seems to refer generally to the point at issue. For statements of the gen-
eral rule see L. R. A. 1915A 663, Ann. Cas. 1917B 232, 9 A. L. R. 195
(1920).
4. In re Stolen, 214 N. W. 379, 193 Wis. 602 (1927); State v. Peck, 88
Conn. 447, 91 At1. 274, Ann. Cas. 1917B 227 (1914) ; People ex rel. Stead v.
Phipps, 261 Ill. 576, 104 N. E. 144 (1914); Hobb's Case, 75 N. H. 285, 73
Atl. 303 (1909); In re Dallenbaugh, 17 Ohio C. C. 106, 9 Ohio C. D. 325
(1899) ; In re Spriggs, 36 Ariz. 262, 284 Pac. 521 (1930) ; In re Burton, 67
Utah 118, 246 Pac. 188 (1926); State ex rel. Dill v. Martin, 45 Wash. 76,
87 Pac. 1054 (1906); In re Davis, 15 Hawaii 377 (1904); cf. In re Simp-
son, 79 Okla. 305, 192 Pac. 1907 (1920), where it was held that "a court
may suspend or disbar an attorney for misconduct in an official capacity";
In re Breen, 30 Nev. 164, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 571, 93 Pac. 997 (1908).
Missouri has not ruled on this point.
5. State Bar of Cal. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323, 278 Pac. 432
(1929) ; People ex rel. Johnson v. Goddard, 11 Colo. 259, 18 Pac. 338 (1888) ;
In re Silkman, 84 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1903); In re Strahl, 195 N. Y. Supp.
385 (1922); In re Gibbs, 51 S. D. 459, 214 N. W. 850 (1927).
6. The respondent had contended in the instant case that during his
tenure of office as judge he was, in effect, suspended from the bar, so that
the bar had no jurisdiction over his private acts. In refusing to allow this
contention the Oklahoma court reached the same result as did the Wiscon-
sin court in the leading case of In re Stolen, 214 N. W. 379, 193 Wis. 602
(1927), wherein it is stated that one "cannot take unto himself any office
or position, or shroud himself in any garb which will place him beyond the
power of this court to keep its roster of attorneys clean."
7. State ex rel. Martin v. Kalb, 50 Wis. 178, 188, 6 N. W. 557 (1880).
(1880).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss2/16
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
criminal proceeding and consequently it is not to be confused with the regu-
lar methods of removing judges.$ Moreover, the power of disbarment is in-
herent in the courts." It is true that as a result of disbarment an attorney
may be disqualified to act as judge, but this is incidental to disbarment and
not the object of a disbarment proceeding.'0 As a result the courts in a
majority of cases very properly refuse to let this constitutional question
be raised to hinder proceedings." By the weight of authority and logic
there is no good reason why an attorney occupying the office of judge, and
committing acts unworthy of his office of attorney should not be disbarred
regardless of the effect on his official position. E. M. F.
CHATTEL MORTAGEs-PRIORITIEs-AcCESSION-[Texas]. 
- One Darden
purchased an automobile from the defendant company, paying part cash and
executing a chattel mortgage on the car, complete with standard attach-
ments, accessories and equipment. This mortgage was duly recorded ac-
cording to Texas law. Thereafter Darden bought new tires for the auto-
mobile from the plaintiff, executing a chattel mortgage on these tires for
the balance due of the purchase price, such mortgage also being recorded.
The new tires were placed on the car, the old ones being returned to Darden.
Subsequently the defendant repossessed the car in accord with the terms
of its chattel mortgage. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant com-
pany to foreclose its mortgage on the tires. Held; for the plaintiff, since
the prior recorded mortgage of the defendant did not include accessories and
equipment subsequently placed on the car, its title thereto depended solely
on inclusion by accretion or accession. Tires, being easily identified by
serial numbers, and being so attached they may be easily removed without
injury to the automobile, do not become part of the car by the rule of
accretion or accession.,
The law of accretion is not applicable to a case of this sort except by
analogy, as it relates only to real property.2 The common law of accession
8. "The proceeding to disbar an attorney is neither a civil action nor a
criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is
not the punishment of the offender, but the protection of the court." In re
Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933), comment 19 ST. Louis
LAW REviEW, 146 (1934) ; In re Noell, 96 S. W. (2d) 213 (Mo. App. 1936);
State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914).
9. In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933), comment 19ST. Louis LAw REvmw 146 (1934); State ex rel. Selleck v. Reynolds, 252
Mo. 369, 158 S. W. 671 (1913); In re Sizer & Gardner, 300 Mo. 369, 254
S. W. 82 (1923).
10. In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379 (1927).
11. In re Stolen, supra, note 10; In re Spriggs, 33 Ariz. 262, 44 Pac. 54(1930); In re Burton, 67 Utah 918, 246 Pac. 188 (1926); In re Dallen-baugh, 17 Ohio C. C. 106, 9 Ohio C. D. 325 (1899); In re Davis, 15 Hawaii
377 (1904).
1. Firestone Service Stores, Inc. v. Darden et al., 96 S. W. (2d) 316 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1936).
2. Bouvier's Laz, Dictionary (Rawle's 3rd Rev. 1914); 1 C. J. 730.
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